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The businessman who has sold his business and incidentally
agreed not to compete with the new owner might think that his
troubles are finally over. But in the light of a recent district court
of appeal decision, his troubles might be just starting. Harrison v.
Cook' decided that a seller breached his covenant not to "establish
or conduct" a competing business when he loaned money to his
son, who then established a competing business. A businessman
would probably be surprised to discover that he gave up his
unrestricted right to loan money when he signed a standard non-
competition covenant.
The court considered the Harrison case one of first impres-
sion in California. Though many other jurisdictions have decided
cases with similar factual situations, the court disregarded the
principles which they developed. Instead it based its decision on
a fundamental principle of contract law which apparently has
never been applied in a similar situation. The result was unex-
pected and exposes standard noncompetition covenants to un-
certain interpretation.
This article will examine the novel rationale of the Harrison
decision. We will first survey California law, then cases from foreignjurisdictions. Finally the unique premise on which the Harrison de-
cision is based, and its possible effect on the drafting of noncompeti-
tion covenants, will be analyzed.
HARRISON V. COOK: COVENANT BREACHED BY LOAN
For thirty-six years Homer Cook was associated with Cook-
Nichols Company, an electrical wholesale supply business in Pasa-
dena. In September of 1957 he sold all the stock in his business to
six buyers who paid $40,000 down and gave Cook five installment
notes for $75,000. Included in the contract of sale was this pro-
vision:
16. Agreement not to Compete. Cook agrees . . . that he shall not
establish or conduct or lend his name to any business organization
doing business in [5 counties] which is competing or attempting to
compete with any line of business now engaged in by the Company. 2
1 213 A.C.A. 557, 29 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1963). Hearing denied by the California
Supreme Court, April 24, 1963.2 Id. at 558, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 270.
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Cook's son, who had been employed in the business since
1949, remained with the new owners for three months. He then
asked Cook for a loan so that he could open a new business in
competition with Cook-Nichols. In January 1958 Cook loaned his
son $20,000 to provide two-thirds of the capital needed to open the
new business, located just two blocks from Cook-Nichols. Later
Cook guaranteed the important Anaconda account for his son's
company.
Within a short time the son induced three of Cook-Nichols'
key employees to come to work for him. Soon the new business
was selling almost entirely to former customers of Cook-Nichols.
As its sales soared, Cook-Nichols' business fell off drastically.
By July 1959 Cook-Nichols was forced to make an assignment for
the benefit of creditors and close its doors.
The buyers, faced with making payments on their notes,
brought an action for a declaratory judgment defining the rights
and liabilities of the parties. They obtained a preliminary injunc-
tion against assignment by Cook of the notes. Cook filed a cross-
complaint in which he sought to recover on the promissory notes.
The trial court found that the competition provided by the
new business, made possible by Cook's loan, his guaranteeing of
one account, and the defection of Cook-Nichols' key employees
were the primary causes of the company's failure. It granted an
injunction restraining Cook from negotiating, assigning, transfer-
ring, selling, or declaring in default or attempting to collect the
notes.
On appeal the district court of appeal stated that, if he
breached his covenant not to compete, Cook forfeited his right
to recover on the notes. A party who complains of breach of con-
tract cannot recover unless he has fulfilled his obligations. But did
Cook violate his promise not to compete? The court conceded that
"technically, defendant is correct in insisting that he neither
'established' nor 'conducted' any business organization which was
competing with any line of business of Cook-Nichols Company,
nor in any literal sense did he 'loan his name' to a competitive
business."4 But the court added that the agreement is not to be
"narrowly, technically" construed.'
Quoting from eases, the court set out two principles: (1) When
the good will of a business is sold, it is not patronage of the gen-
3 Pry Corp. of America, 177 Cal. App. 2d 632, 639, 2 Cal. Rptr. 425, 429 (1960).
4 213 A.C.A. at 560, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 271.
5 Ibid.
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eral public that is sold, but that particular patronage which has
become an asset of the business; 6 (2) the law implies in every
contract a covenant that neither party will do anything to deprive
the other of the benefits of the contract.7 Finding no California
case precisely in point, the court cited Dowd v. Bryce8 as one that
"gives effect to this philosophy of statements that we have just
quoted" and determines the conclusion in this case.
In the Dowd case the seller of a grocery-liquor store promised
not to compete or to sell land to any one cQntemplating a business
which would compete with the buyer. In an action for declaratory
judgment the court held that the seller would breach his covenant
if he leased property to one who planned to compete. Without
further discussion of the Dowd case or the "philosophy" it was
said to encompass, the court concluded that Cook breached his
noncompetition agreement and thus could not recover any of the
payments due under the $75,000 notes.
COVENANTS NOT To COMPETE: CALIFORNIA CASES
California's Business and Professions Code Section 16600
voids every contract to the extent that it restrains anyone from
engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business. Two exceptions
provide for certain types of noncompetition agreements, which
are restraint on trade and business. Business and Professions
Code Section 16601 allows the seller of the good will of a business,
or any shareholder selling all his shares in a corporation,' to
agree not to carry on a competing business within a specified
geographical area where the business has been operating. Busi-
ness and Professions Code Section 16602 permits similar non-
competition agreement in partnership dissolutions.'0
Since a California contract for the sale of a business may
include a noncompetition covenant," the courts occasionally are
called upon to determine what is a breach of a covenant not to
6 Bergum v. Weber, 136 Cal. App. 2d 389, 392, 288 P.2d 623, 625 (1955).
7 Brown v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 2d 559, 564, 212 P.2d 878, 881 (1949);
Harm v. Frasher, 181 Cal. App. 2d 405, 417, 5 Cal. Rptr. 367, 374 (1960); Bergum
v. Weber, 136 Cal. App. 2d 389, 392, 288 P.2d 623, 625 (1955). Only the last case
deals with a non-competition covenant.
8 95 Cal. App. 2d 644, 213 P.2d 500, 14 A.L.R.2d 1329 (1950).
9 64 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1388 (1962). After Harrison was decided, Business
and Professions Code § 16601 was amended (Cal. Stats. 1963, ch. 597, § 1, p. 785)
to include shareholders of a corporation selling substantially all its assets.
1O See generally Comment, 1 SANTA CLARA LAw. 28 (1961).
11 CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, ADVISING
CALIFORNIA BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 1002 (1958).
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compete. In some cases the seller 2 has been so straightforward
in his competitive activity that the court has no difficulty finding
a breach. In Akers v. Rappe'8 a seller who had entered into a
noncompetition agreement furnished his son with a building and
finances so that he could compete with the buyer. He advised his
son, did all of the difficult jewelry repair work, and made sales
and collections. To emphasize to the public his connection with his
son's business he did his work at a bench in the front window
of the shop. This, held the court, was a flagrant violation of the
spirit and letter of the contract.
A seller who bought part interest in a competing business
and managed it violated his agreement. Even if the seller had ac-
quired no pecuniary interest in the business, commented the court
in Johnston v. Blanchard,4 he would have breached his covenant
by acting as its manager. Bringing one's skill, name, and influence
to the aid of a competitor violates a noncompetition covenant.
Seller convenanted not to buy into a competing orchard
heater business or manufacture orchard heaters. He then associated
with a manufacturer and marketer of competitive products and
added his well-known name to the competitor's business. The court
in Mahlstedt v. Fugit15 enjoined the seller from breaching his
covenant by associating with a competitor.
In these cases the seller made no attempt to disguise his
competitive activity. His violation of the covenant not to compete
was direct and even flagrant. In other cases the seller has been
more ingenious and has attempted to circumvent his agreement.
Perhaps the earliest attempt to disguise competition is found in
Meyers v. Merillion.6 There a seller argued that he had not
breached his covenant by merely acting as agent for a competitor.
He asserted that a noncompetition covenant could be construed
to restrain him only from carrying on a competing business, not
acting as its agent. The court saw through the sham and held that
an agent of a competitor does carry on the competitor's business.
A seller may try to find a method of getting somebody else,
12 The following "abbreviations" are used in this article: seller = seller of a
business and its good will who has covenanted not to compete; buyer = buyer of
such business; competitor or competing business = person or business who competes
with the buyer; covenant, agreement, or promise = standard covenant not to es-
tablish or carry on a competing business within a certain geographical area, often
limited to a certain period of time.
13 30 Cal. App. 290, 158 Pac. 129 (1916).
14 16 Cal. App. 321, 116 Pac. 973 (1911).
15 79 Cal. App. 2d 562, 180 P.2d 777 (1947).
16 118 Cal. 352, 50 Pac. 662 (1897).
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who is not bound by an agreement, to compete in his behalf. A
seller bought a competing business and leased it to another. He
loaned money to the lessee to construct buildings and became an
employee of the business. In H. G. Fenton Mat. Co. v. Challet"
the court enjoined the seller from aiding the lessee, and lessee from
aiding the seller, in violating the noncompetition agreement. Com-
mented the court: "The court may . . . enjoin the party com-
plained of not only from violating [the covenant's] terms but also
employing or combining with others to accomplish the same re-
sult."'
8
Attempting to get around his obligation not to compete, an-
other seller formed corporations which competed with the buyer's
business. In Bramwell v. Airport Blue Print Co. 9 the court affirmed
a judgment for an injunction and damages, holding that the cor-
porations were "formed for the purpose of enabling [the seller]
to circumvent his convenant with the plaintiff, and that [the seller]
dominates and controls the said corporations." Similarly where a
seller's wife bought stock in a competing corporation, using seller's
money, the court held that the seller seriously breached his agree-
ment.2 o
The California cases indicate that a seller breaches his non-
competition covenant whenever he competes with the buyer,
whether he does this directly or obliquely. Attempts to disguise
competition by setting up a front or working through third parties
have failed. But until the Harrison case, no California case had
decided whether a seller's loan to a competitor fell within the
class of activities prohibited. Other jurisdictions, though, have
been called upon to decide whether a loan to a competitor violated
a noncompetition agreement.
LOANS TO COMPETITORS: FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS
A. Loan or Credit Only
Courts have long held that a seller who loans money to finance
a competitor's business does not violate his covenant. In Bird v.
Lake" the court held that the seller of a restaurant did not violate
his covenant by financing a competing restaurant, even though
his only security for repayment was the competitor's profits. The
37 49 Cal. App. 2d 410, 121 P.2d 788 (1942).
18 Id. at 415, 121 P.2d at 791.
19 154 Cal. App. 2d 57, 315 P.2d 360 (1957).
20 Macken v. Martinez, 214 A.C.A. 840, 29 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1963).
21 1 Hem. & M. 338, 71 Eng. Rep. 147 (V.C. Court 1863).
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seller would have breached his agreement, though, if he had acted
as manager of a competitor's restaurant, or even as a waiter. Noth-
ing, added the court, would prevent the seller from buying restau-
rants and reselling them.
In Harkinson's Appeal22 a benevolent seller set her son up
in business by advancing money and otherwise helping him. Citing
Bird v. Lake the court stated that a covenant is not violated when
a seller loans money to a competing business, or takes back a
mortgage to secure a loan, even though the competitor's only
means of repayment is out of the competing business' profits.
Though a seller who loans money to a competitor may not
act in "perfect good faith," commented the court in Finch Bros.
v. Michael,2" he does not violate his covenant.
Selling a business or goods to a competitor on credit does not
violate a seller's covenant not to compete. In William Cory & Son
Ltd. v. Harrison24 a seller sold one of his businesses and covenanted
not to be "engaged or concerned or interested in" competing busi-
nesses. Later he sold an allied business on credit to one who began
competing with the first buyer. The court held that though in the
ordinary sense the seller was "concerned or interested in" the com-
peting business, in the businessman's understanding he was not.
It would be impracticable to hold a seller liable simply because
he became a creditor of a competitor. Another court held selling
stock to a competing druggist and taking a mortgage for the price
did not violate the seller's noncompetition agreement. 25
A recent Massachusetts case 26 closely parallels the Harrison
fact situation. The owner of a wholesale candy and tobacco busi-
ness sold out and agreed he would not "directly or indirectly, as
employer or otherwise, engage in the wholesale candy or tobacco
business in . . . Massachusetts in a capacity were [seller] will
personally solicit, directly or indirectly, retailers . . . nor do
anything to the prejudicing of the good will." Seller later became
comaker of a $20,000 note for a loan to his son-in-law, who used
the money to start a competing business. The seller took the ac-
counts receivable of the competing business as security. He did
nothing else to help the business.
The court decided that the purpose of the covenant was to
exclude the seller from activity which would interfere with his for-
22 78 Pa. 196, 21 Am. Rep. 9 (1875).
23 167 N.C. 322, 83 S.E. 458 (1914).
24 [1906] A.C. 274.
25 Reeves v. Sprague, 114 N.C. 647, 19 S.E. 707 (1894).
26 Slate Co. v. Bikash, 343 Mass. 172, 177 N.E.2d 780 (1961).
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mer business' existing customer relationships and might be espe-
cially effective because of his relation with his old customers. But
the seller's loan to a competitor in no way attracted old customers
to the son-in-law's business. The seller made no use of his personal
relationships or experience to gain his former customers for the
new business. At most he helped a competitor finance his business,
without any publicity or attempt to attract old customers. The
court refused to interpret the seller's covenant to include a re-
straint on loaning money to a competitor, even though the seller
had expressly agreed not to do "anything to the prejudicing of the
good will."
The principle is clear. A seller does not breach his agreement
to refrain from competing by loaning money to a competitor,
whether he extends credit on the sale of a business or goods or
otherwise finances him. But the courts have gone further. Even
the seller who actively helps a competitor, in addition to loaning
him money or otherwise financing him, is often held not to have
violated his agreement.
B. Loan Plus Other Help
The case of General Bronze Corp. v. Schmeling" presents an
unusual situation which exemplifies the courts' tendency to allow
a loan to a competitor plus other direct aid. Sellers agreed not to
engage in a competing business, though they reserved the right
to become employees of a competitor. When the sellers violated
their covenant by acquiring a competing business, the buyer ob-
tained an injunction ordering the sellers to dissolve the offending
business. In compliance the sellers sold the firm's assets to another
competitor and became the latter's employees, each seller to have
salary plus a share of the competitor's profits. Though the sellers
had reserved the right to become employees of a competitor, it
was argued that the total transaction constituted at least indirect
competition. But the court held that the transaction did not consti-
tute a forbidden investment. The sale created only a creditor-debtor
relationship between the sellers and the competing business, which
was not a breach of sellers' promise.
Other cases have reached the same result.2 In Adams v.
Adams29 a seller, while not loaning money to a competitor, helped
his wife and another establish and conduct a competitive business.
27 213 Wis. 150, 250 N.W. 412 (1933).
28 Battershell v. Bauer, 91 Ill. App. 181 (1900); McKeighan Wachter Co. v.
Swanson, 138 Wash. 682, 245 Pac. 10 (1926).
29 156 Neb. 778, 58 N.W.2d 172 (1953).
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Seller had no financial interest in the business. The court held
that a covenant in restraint of trade is strictly construed in favor
of the party on whom the restraint is imposed. "If he [seller] had
furnished financial assistance to his wife that would not have con-
stituted setting up and establishing a new competitive business.
.. .,,o The seller bound himself only to refrain from establish-
ing a competing business. Thus he could with impunity help his
wife in her competing business."
Not all courts are so generous to the seller who reaches the
borderline of competition. Some cases hold that a seller who not
only loans money but also' extends other aid to a competitor has
pushed beyond the twilight zone into the area of active competi-
tion forbidden him. In C. H. Barret Co. v. Ainsworth 2 a seller
advanced his son $1500 to start a competing grain elevator and
endorsed a note for the business. In addition he gave freely of his
advice and evidently bought grain for his son. The court found
that the seller violated his agreement.
After agreeing not to become interested in a competing busi-
ness, a seller helped his brother-in-law establish a business next
door to the buyer. He extended credit, guaranteed accounts, ad-
vised on choices of merchandise, and went with his brother-in-law
to make selections. The seller's influence was too evident in the
conduct of the competitive business, and the New York court
found that the seller breached his covenant.83
Where a seller financed a competitive business established by
his wife and also managed it the court held that this was nothing
more than an evasion of his agreement. 4
Only one case has been found that holds, as does Harrison,
that a seller who loans money to a competitor breaches his non-
competition convenant. In Davis v. Barney5 a seller transferred
his half-interest in a line of stages and promised that he would
"not be concerned, directly or indirectly, in any line of stages in
opposition to them." The court held that this agreement would be
violated if the seller furnished a competing line with money, credit,
or other assistance. It is not clear whether the seller merely made
loans to the competitor or also gave him other help.
80 Id. at 789, 58 N.W.2d at 179.
31 See also Smith v. Hancock, [1894] 2 Ch. 377 (CA.).
82 156 Mich. 351, 120 N.W. 797 (1909).
33 Amsterdam v. Marmor, 125 Misc. 865, 212 N.Y.S. 300 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
34 Weickgenant v. Eccles, 173 Mich. 695, 140 N.W. 513 (1913).
35 2 Gill. & J. 382 (Md. Ct. App. 1830).
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DEPARTURE FROM RULE: A NEW PRINCIPLE?
A. Bergum v. Weber: Implied Covenant of Good Faith
What influenced the court to depart from this long and es-
tablished line of authority? To begin with, no California case
found by the court dealt with precisely the situation presented in
Harrison. Thus the rule that a seller does not violate his covenant
when he loans money to a competitor, generally accepted else-
where, had never been applied in California. Though the court
apparently did not consider itself bound by this rule, it did not
explain its reasons for disregarding it. Instead the court turned to
another principle of law as a rationale for its decision.
The principle of contract law on which the court based its
conclusion is an elementary one: in every contract is implied a
covenant of good faith, that neither party will do anything to
deprive the other of the benefits of the contract. 6 While three
cases are cited by the court in support of this proposition, only
one deals with breach of a noncompetition agreement.87
In Bergum v. Weber8 seller sold his share of a partnership
to his partner and expressly agreed that he would not directly or
indirectly engage in a competing business for a period of one year.
After the expiration of one year seller began to solicit actively
customers who had continued doing business with his former
partner. The seller did not thereby breach his express covenant
which had expired. But, asks the court, did the seller violate an im-
plied covenant? "The law implies in every contract a covenant that
neither party will do anything that will deprive the other of the
fruits of his bargain."89 A seller's direct solicitation of old cus-
tomers is a violation of this covenant.40 Though the seller may be-
gin soliciting the patronage of the general public after his general
noncompetition covenant expires, he violates this implied covenant
of good faith if he directly solicits the business of his old customers.
The seller raised an interesting point in his defense. He con-
tended that where parties to a contract expressly agree as to any
86 1 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW 271-273 (7th ed. 1960).
37 Bergum v. Weber, 136 Cal. App. 2d 389, 288 P.2d 623 (1955). Cases not
dealing with noncompetition covenant: Brown v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 2d 559,
212 P.2d 878 (1949) deals with a contract to make mutual wills; Harm. v. Frasher,
181 Cal. App. 2d 405, 5 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1960) concerns a contract for sale of
corporate stock.
38 136 Cal. App. 2d 389, 288 P.2d 623 (1955).
39 Bergum v. Weber, supra note 38, at 392, 288 P.2d at 625. The same sentence
is quoted in Harrison at 560, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 271.
40 Handyspot Co. v. Buegeleisen, 128 Cal. App. 2d 191, 274 P.2d 938 (1954).
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matter, no covenant as to that matter may be implied.41 Since he
expressly agreed not to compete for one year, this should be the
literal limit of his obligation. A further covenant, since it deals
with the subject matter expressly agreed upon, could not be implied.
The court conceded that it could not imply an obligation on
the seller's part if the parties expressly contracted as to that
obligation. Neither could a promise by the seller be implied if it
would be inconsistent with an express obligation. But, though the
express restrictive covenant and the implied covenant of good
faith dealt with related subject matter, the implied promise was
not contradicted by or inconsistent with the express promise.42
Since the express covenant did not indicate any intention that the
usual covenant of good faith should not be implied, the court
found that the two covenants were consistent and could exist
side by side.48
Bergum v. Weber thus stands for two propositions: (1) Every
contract contains an implied covenant by each party not to deprive
the other of the benefit of the contract. This covenant of good
faith is violated by a seller who directly solicits business from his
former customers. (2) This covenant not to solicit former customers
directly may be implied even though the parties have contracted on
the subject of noncompetition, so long as the covenants are not
contradictory or inconsistent.
That the seller of a business in a sale which includes good will
is not permitted to solicit his old customers directly even in the
absence of a noncompetition covenant, is clearly correct.4 Unless
he had agreed otherwise, he may solicit customers from any other
source. 5 If he agrees not to compete, though, and the covenant
expires, the court is not rewriting the contract when it holds the
seller obligated to refrain from direct solicitation of former custo-
mers. The buyer gave consideration for the right to be free from
that specific type of interference when he purchased the seller's
good will.4"
41 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1656: "All things that in law or usage are considered as
incidental to a contract, or as necessary to carry it into effect, are implied therefrom,
unless some of them are expressly mentioned therein, when all other things of the
same class are deemed to be excluded."
42 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 564 (1951).
43 1 WITKIN, op. cit. supra note 36, at 273-274.
44 Handyspot Co. v. Buegeleisen, 128 Cal. App. 2d 191, 274 P.2d 938 (1954);
3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 568 (1951).
45 Kaye v. Tellsen, 129 Cal. App. 2d 115, 118, 276 P.2d 611, 613 (1954):
"Where a contract of sale of a business has no restriction on the right of the
seller to continue or re-engage in the same character of business, an agreement not
to do so will not be implied from the sale of the goodwill. . ....
46 6A CORBn, CONTRACTS § 1386 (1962).
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Corbin suggests a further rationale for implying an agreement
not to solicit old customers directly. The implied promise in Bergum
v. Weber "might be regarded as identical with a purely legal duty
against unfair competition." '47 A legal duty would not be considered
inconsistent with the express covenant; the court would assume
that the parties did not intend to countenance unfair competition.
It is not difficult to understand the court's rationale in holding
that the covenant of good faith was violated by the seller's active
solicitation of his old customers. One who sells a business with
its good will sells the expectation that an established clientele
will continue to patronize the business." Certainly this expectation
figured in the selling price. To allow the seller to entice away
his former customers by dircet solicitation would be to deprive
the buyer of a primary benefit for which he bargained and paid.4"
Not so easy to understand is the court's reasoning in Harrison.
The court does not explain how the rationale of Bergum v. Weber
applies to the facts of Harrison. The cases are similar in one re-
spect only: both found that the seller breached not his express
covenant but his implied covenant not to deprive the buyer of the
benefits of the contract. Here any similarity ends. In Bergum the
seller actively and directly solicited former customers; in Harri-
son the seller loaned money and guaranteed one account. Assum-
ing that all contracts contain an implied covenant of good faith,
it is arguable that Cook's loaning money was in no way similar to
the active solicitation of former customers by the seller in Bergum.
The conclusion that Cook violated an implied covenant of
good faith by loaning money to a competitor may be challenged
on the grounds that an implied covenant of good faith does not
encompass a promise to refrain from loaning money to (or guar-
anteeing an account for) a competitor. Courts have long held that
a loan of money does not constitute breach of a noncompetition
covenant, express or implied, and they hesitate to imply an ob-
ligation unless certain conditions exist.
In Cousins Inv. Co. v. Hastings Clothing Co. the court sum-
marized the rules bearing on a court's right to imply covenants:
(1) the implication must arise from the language used or it must
be indispensable to effectuate the intention of the parties; (2) it must
47 3 CoRBiN, CONTRACTS § 568 (1951).
48 6A CoR.IN, CONTRACTS § 1385 (1962).
49 Tobin v. Cody, 343 Mass. 716, 722, 180 N.E.2d 652, 656 (1962), quoting
from an earlier case holding that the reason for implying a covenant not to compete
when a business and its good will have been sold is "'that it is necessary to give
the purchaser what is sold to him' (emphasis supplied)." Cf. Denawetz v. Milch,
407 Pa. 115, 178 A.2d 701 (1962).
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appear from the language used that it was so clearly within the
contemplation of the parties that they deemed it unnecessary to express
it; (3) implied covenants can only be justified on the grounds of
legal necessity; (4) a promise can be implied only where it can be
rightfully assumed that it would have been made if attention had been
called to it; (5) there can be no implied covenant where the subject
is completely covered by the contract.50
These rules were adopted by the California Supreme Court in
Lippman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co." Following these rules a court
will be hesitant to imply a promise to do or refrain from doing
a specific act. In Foley v. Euless,52 for example, a packer agreed
to process raisins delivered by a group of growers. The contract
prohibited him from accepting raisins from other growers but did
not expressly obligate the contracting growers to deliver any cer-
tain quantity of their crop. When the packer complained that only
a small part of the crop was delivered, the court held that the
growers had no implied obligation to deliver any raisins.55 Quoting
the decision of the district court of appeal, the supreme court
stated: "Where parties have entered into written engagements
which industriously express the obligations which each is to
assume . . . the presumption is that having expressed some they
have expressed all of the conditions by which they intended to be
bound." 4 Though the result is questionable, it shows the length
to which a court will go to avoid implying an obligation.55
Even though it be conceded that every contract contains a
covenant of good faith, it is apparent that California courts have
been hestitant to construe this covenant so as to impose unexpected
obligations on a party. A court must first find that the implied
covenant (1) meets the five-fold prerequisites outlined above and
(2) is not inconsistent with or contradictory to any express obliga-
tion. Cook's express covenant in Harrison would not be inconsistent
with an implied covenant against loaning money. But it is not at
50 45 Cal. App. 2d 141, 149, 113 P.2d 878, 882 (1941).
51 44 Cal. 2d 136, 142, 280 P.2d 775, 779 (1955).
52 214 Cal. 506, 6 P.2d 956 (1931).
53 Cf. Milton v. Hudson Sales, 152 Cal. App. 2d 418, 313 P.2d 936 (1957), noted
in 10 HASTINGS L.J. 99 (1958).
54 214 Cal. at 512, 6 P.2d at 958.
55 See also Tanner v. Olds, 29 Cal. 2d 110, 173 P.2d 6 (1946); Tanner v.
Title Ins. & Trust Co., 20 Cal. 2d 814, 129 P.2d 383 (1942); Taylor v. National
Supply Co., 12 Cal. App. 2d 557, 56 P.2d 263 (1936); Loyaton Co. v. California
Co., 22 Cal. App. 75, 113 Pac. 323 (1913). 60 HAv. L. REV. 648 (1947), commenting
on the Tanner cases, suggests that where a restrictive covenant may not be implied
because the subject is expressly dealt with in the contract, the court might reach a
different result by invoking the implied covenant that neither party will do anything
to injure the rights of the other to receive the fruits of the contract.
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all clear that his covenant could meet the other requirements.
Among the five-fold prerequisites for implying a covenant are:
(1) its practical and legal necessity; (2) the tacit intention by
both parties to deem the obligation part of the contract; and (3)
lack of an express covenant completely covering the subject matter
of the alleged implied covenant. 56
On this last prerequisite, an implied covenant not to loan
to a competitor might be considered excluded by the express non-
competition covenant in Harrison, since the latter may have been
intended as the entire agreement on the subject of future competi-
tion. Loans to competitors not specifically prohibited, an implied
covenant could not be raised to forbid them. Even assuming that
the express covenant did not thus exclude an implied covenant
against loans, such a covenant would have difficulty meeting re-
quirements 1 and 2. Harrison, therefore, has gone further than
previous California cases in implying an obligation on part of a
seller who agrees not to compete.
B. The Dowd Case: Makeweight
To bolster its theory that loaning money to a competitor
violated the implied covenant of good faith, the court chose Dowd
v. Bryce57 as the case best representing that principle. In Dowd
the covenant was broader than in Harrison. The sellers agreed to
not "directly or indirectly, engage in similar businesses . . .nor
knowingly, to sell any land" to a potential competitor.5" Further
they promised not to "do or cause to be done, any wilful act or
thing to the prejudice of said trades or businesses . . . ."' Later
the sellers brought an action for declaratory judgment to deter-
mine whether a lease to a person intending to compete with buyers
would violate their covenant. Even though the restriction on selling
land might be an invalid restraint on alienation, this specific pro-
hibition showed that the parties intended a general restriction on
acts which would promote competition. The court held that a
lease by sellers to an acknowledged competitor would fall within
the broad scope of prohibited competition and be a direct violation
of the covenant.
The court, however, also based its decision on the theory
that the sellers would be guilty of indirect competition if they
56 Cousins Inv. Co. v. Hastings Clothing Co., 45 Cal. App. 2d 141, 149, 113
P.2d 878, 882 (1941) ; see text accompanying note 50, supra.
57 95 Cal. App. 2d 644, 213 P.2d 500, 14 A.L.R.2d 1329 (1950).




leased property to a competitor. The sellers would know that the
lessee was paying rent out of profits made from competition. "By
his very act of leasing [seller] creates competition. His act is
one link in the chain which creates the very competition which it
was the object of the clause in question to prevent."8 0 Since the
court had already decided that leasing would be a direct violation
of the agreement, it was unnecessary to find that leasing was in-
direct competition.
It is strange that the court could find that Dowd "points to
the conclusion" that loaning money violated the seller's implied
covenant of good faith. Harrison can be easily distinguished.
Cook's covenant that he would "not establish or conduct" a com-
peting business was not as broad a restriction as that in Dowd,
which specifically prohibited sale to a competitor. The agreement
was directed at keeping Cook himself from competing. Unlike
the seller in Dowd, Cook could have sold or leased land located
next door to his old business to a potential competitor without
breaching his promise. But most significant is that Dowd makes no
mention at all of the implied covenant of good faith upon which
the Harrison decision rests four-square.
While the court does not explain its reasoning, it apparently
was most impressed by Dowd's emphasis on the voluntariness of
seller's entering into a lessor-lessee relationship with a competitor,
knowing that he would get his rent out of the competitors profits.
But the crux of the Dowd decision was the court's recognition that
the sellers had expressly covenanted not to sell land to a competitor.
This, said the court, meant that the seller agreed not to do any-
thing to promote competition, including lease property to a com-
petitor. In Dowd the sellers did exactly that, thus directly breach-
ing their express agreement.
If anything, the Dowd case is less persuasive than Bergum
v. Weber. In neither the Bergum or Harrison cases did the seller
breach his express covenant; thus the decisions had to rest on
breach of an implied covenant. But in Dowd the seller clearly
breached his express covenant, and the court had no occasion to
invoke an implied obligation. The court's reliance in Harrison
on the Dowd case is thus subject to question on the ground that
the factual situations are so different that they call for application
of different principles of law.




None of the cases, either California or other, anticipated the
decision in Harrison. Cases from foreign jurisdictions almost uni-
versally take the position that a seller who loans money to a com-
petitor or guarantees an account does not violate his noncompeti-
tion covenant. The court, in accepting the buyer's agrument that
an implied covenant forbade such a loan, casts doubt on the mean-
ing of the standard covenant not to compete. Such a covenant
usually purports to prohibit only carrying on or engaging in com-
petitive business, directly or indirectly." If courts may imply a
further obligation by the seller to refrain from even a tenuous
connection with a competitor, the buyer gets more than he bar-
gained for, while the seller inadvertently gives up important rights
he never contemplated parting with.
To obviate this uncertainty attorneys may resort to drafting
more explicit agreements, expressly setting out the activities per-
mitted and prohibited to the seller. A covenant might, for example,
specify that the seller may not loan money to a competitor, or do
other acts not ordinarily thought of as competition. But prohibit-
ing such activities might restrain trade or business in a manner
not permitted by Business and Professions Code Section 16601.
This section allows only covenants against "carrying on a similar
business." Any agreement which goes beyond the terms of the sec-
tion would be a restraint on trade subject to being voided under
Business and Professions Code Section 16600.62
If Harrison's rationale is to be applied in the future, the
seller of a business would be well advised to examine carefully
his relations with present and potential competitors of his buyer.
So long as a noncompetition agreement may be so liberally in-
terpreted, the seller can never be certain whether he is staying
within the bounds of his agreement. Where the purchase price of
a business may be at stake, the seller and buyer are entitled to
more precise guidelines.
Theodore E. Fleischer
61 CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, ADVISINO
CALIFORNIA Busnqmss ENTERPRISES 1002 (1958).
62 See California Linoleum & Shades Supplies, Inc. v. Schultz, 105 Cal. App.
471, 474, 287 Pac. 980, 981 (1930): "Contracts in restraint of trade are not favored
in law beyond the extent to which they are authorized by statute and the scope
is not to be extended by a construction which imports into them a meaning which
cannot be found in the language of the contract."
